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by Paul Cheshire, London School of Economics & Stefano Magrini, University of Venice  
 
This paper investigates growth differences in the urban system of the EU12 between the means of 
1978/80 and 1992/94 for a data set relating to Functional Urban Regions rather than the more 
normal NUTS regions comparing the results of ‘artisanal’ methods of model selection with those 
obtained using general to specific model selection with PcGets. The artisanal approach tests 
hypotheses relating to the role of human capital, EU integration and fragmentation of urban 
government. The paper also explores issues of spatial dependence and mechanisms of spatial 
interaction. Using PcGets as suggested by Hendry and Krolzig (2004) to optimise model selection 
yields a model acceptable on the basis of standard econometric tests and similar in terms of basic 
results to the artisanal approach if mechanisms of spatial interaction are ignored. Testing, however, 
reveals problems of spatial dependence. We interpret this as indicating that significant variables 
reflecting mechanisms of spatial economic adjustment have been omitted. Including such variables in 
the data set available to PcGets leads to the inclusion of three measures of spatial adjustment. 
Further testing shows that problems of spatial dependence are now eliminated. We interpret this 
result as evidence that while PcGets provides a powerful tool for model selection when applied to 
cross sectional data, caution is necessary to ensure that variables relating to spatial adjustment 
processes are included and spatial dependence is avoided. Not only do the results provide consistent 
estimates of parameters but they also support relevant theoretical insights. Moreover careful testing 
for spatial dependence reveals that national borders are still significant barriers to adjustment 
within the EU.  
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This paper analyses the growth of GDP p.c. across functionally defined metropolitan regions - 
represented as Functional Urban Regions (FURs - see section 2) - in the EU of 12 between 1978 and 
1994. We have two purposes: the first is to test some propositions about sources of urban growth 
derived as tightly as possible from underlying theory. The second – prompted by Hendry and Krolzig 
(2004) - is to explore the application of general to specific model selection (using the PcGets 
software) when applied to spatial cross sectional data. Being primarily designed for time series 
analysis, PcGets does not consider issues of spatial dependence. We find that this could lead to 
inconsistent estimates unless the General Underlying Model (GUM) data set includes variables 
specifically designed to reflect appropriate spatial economic mechanisms. When suitable variables 
are included in the GUM, however, we find that PcGets selects a specific model including them and 
problems of spatial dependence are eliminated. In contrast to the more orthodox spatial dependence 
literature (see, for example, Rey and Montouri, 1999 or Florax et al., 2003) we view indicated 
problems of spatial dependence as signs of omitted variables in the underlying GUM – the data set 
does not include variables underlying one of the significant classes of relationships. This should 
prompt researchers to re-specify their models finding suitable (spatial) variables to reflect the 
economic mechanisms giving rise to the spatial dependence. The need for such an approach is, in our 
judgement, re-enforced by the fact that we only find indications of spatial dependence when the 
spatial weights matrix is formulated in an economically meaningful way, including a specific and 
substantial distance penalty for spatial interactions across national borders.  
 
A difference from Hendry and Krolzig (2004) is that we do claim inference for our final models. We 
fully recognise the set of conditions they identify
2 which, in principle, have to hold if the traditional 
cross sectional growth models are to be used for inference. We would, however, argue that i) it is 
inappropriate to invoke such conditions in a categorical sense. In actual applied econometrics the 
issue is not an absolute one but one of degree. No specification can claim a priori to satisfy 
conditions for inference if for no other reason than that the DGP is fundamentally unknown; as 
applied economists, we inevitably rely on theory and knowledge to guide us to the best 
approximation we can specify. It is inevitably a matter of judgment (conditioned on the knowledge 
                                                 
1 The  authors have benefited from many discussions with colleagues as this work has developed. The authors retain 
responsibility for any remaining deficiencies or errors. This paper draws on work undertaken for a project within the 
ESRC’s Cities Initiative under Award  L 130251015 whose support is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
2 “The validity of a selected model depends primarily on the adequacy of the general unrestricted model (GUM) as an 
approximation of the data generating process (DGP). In turn, that involves the measurement accuracy of the data series, 
the representation of the underlying causal effects, the completeness of the information (both variables and observations), 
the homogeneity of the sample; the independence assumptions justifying regression; the weak exogeneity of the 
regressors (instruments); and the constancy of the parameters across the observations. Every one of these assumptions is 
open to legitimate doubt in the ‘growth regressions’ context.” (Hendry and Krolzig, 2004, page 800) 
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we have) whether the proposed specification can be accepted as an adequate approximation of the 
(unknown) DGP. The relevant question is always: in the particular case, is the departure from the 
ideal with respect to all conditions sufficient to raise serious doubts as to the use of the model for 
purposes of inference? While sharing a substantial degree of scepticism with respect to the great bulk 
of the ‘growth regressions’ literature, it is our judgement that its majors sources of problems lies with 
the application of the methodology to cross country analysis (in which case there is a serious doubt 
about both the homogeneity of the sample and the accuracy of the data) and cross regional analysis 
when those regions are neither economically self contained nor homogeneous.  With respect to the 
other conditions we have simply done our best but would argue that by using large urban regions in 
relatively homogeneous Western Europe as our units of observation and attempting to include data 
informed as clearly as possible by urban economic theory, we minimise (but do not categorically 
eliminate) the departure from the ideal conditions necessary for inference to be valid. With that 
admission, it is clear that when we move from drawing conclusions about the need to include spatial 
processes in cross sectional analysis to drawing conclusions with respect to hypothesis testing we 
cross a line and need to be more cautious in our claims. 
 
In a previous paper (Cheshire and Magrini, 2006), we tested the extent to which it is reasonable to 
assume that there is a unified European urban system within which there is enough factor mobility to 
generate a spatial equilibrium between cities and regions. Spatial equilibrium was defined in the 
usual way as a situation in which individuals cannot improve their welfare by moving to another city 
or region. We rejected such a ‘compensating differentials’ worldview as a maintained assumption for 
the EU’s major city regions because the evidence not only shows that migration flows are relatively 
small but those associated with quality of life differences are confined to national borders. In that 
sense, city-regions within the EU seem to behave like city-states, not as simply the spatial units from 
which a homogeneous continental economy is constructed. The central assumption of perfectly 
mobile factors and the equalisation of real marginal returns across cities explicit in models of 
compensating variations (see Roback 1982 or, for a more recent application to US urban growth, 
Glaeser et al., 1995) cannot reasonably be maintained in the European context. This implies that 
differences in GDP per capita between the major city-regions of the EU not only reflect differences 
in productivity but also differences in welfare. 
 
We must emphasise at the outset that we are not taking the convergence approach applied in the 
numerous studies in the vein of Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991). Indeed the initial 
level of GDP per capita does not feature in any of the GUM data sets the analysis of which is 
reported in the paper although for completeness we did include it in an unreported analysis of a 
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GUM1. The variable was not selected for any specific model. For recent surveys of the β-
convergence literature see, for example, Durlauf and Quah, 1999; Temple, 1999; or Magrini, 2004.  
 
We are interested in testing theoretically derived ideas about urban growth. We have three groups of 
variables designed to test these hypotheses. The first group relates to the impact of systematic spatial 
effects of European integration on urban growth. Concern about the spatial effects of European 
integration go back at least to Clark et al (1969) and it is interesting to use as independent variables 
the quantitative measures actually derived by Clark and his associates before the impact of European 
integration was significantly felt. Interest in these factors has been given a significant boost as a 
result of the theoretical developments of New Economic Geography as summarised, for example, in 
Fujita et al., 1999. In addition to the variable measuring Clark et al’s (1969) change in regional 
economic potential associated with EU integration we have a ‘peripherality’ dummy.  
 
The second group of variables we are interested in attempts to capture the role of R & D and human 
capital in urban growth processes. Here we are interested in testing a spatialised adaptation of 
endogenous growth theory (see Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1995 or, for a more rigorous development, 
Magrini, 1997 and 1998). The third area we are interested in investigating is the relationship between 
systems of city government and city growth performance. If we suspend our disbelief and assume 
that local policies might influence FUR growth rates - abstracting for the moment from what form 
such policies might take - then it is clear that local policy makers would be producing a pure local 
public good. So, the relevant issue is what factors favour the formation of more effective growth 
promotion ‘clubs’. Since our FUR boundaries (see Section 2) are by definition designed to maximise 
self-containment, any positive impact of local growth promotion will be contained with them. Here 
we test one of the basic propositions of fiscal federalism: that 'the existence and magnitude of 
spillover effects clearly depends on the geographical extent of the relevant jurisdiction' (Oates, 
1999). Moreover, the larger the main unit of government is relative to the FUR as a whole, the lower 
transactions costs are likely to be in forming a growth promotion club. So, we test whether there is a 
positive relationship between the degree of co-incidence of governmental boundaries with those of 
functionally defined city-regions and the growth performance of the city-region.  
 
Since we are analysing urban growth in a cross sectional model we might reasonably expect to find 
interactions between the growth performance of neighbouring cities. As a result, we have paid 
particular attention to issues of spatial dependence. Spatial econometrics tends to exist as a distinct 
field of interest in which a finding of spatial dependence is often an end in itself  - to be ‘corrected’ 
sometimes by introducing spatial lags or by other appropriate econometric techniques depending on 
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the exact nature of the problem. Our views are somewhat different. It seems important to test for 
spatial dependence since, if it is present, and the analysis does not properly take it into account, we 
will not get consistent estimates of the effects of the variables we are interested in. However, it seems 
to us that the discovery of spatial dependence should trigger a further, but economically inspired, 
investigation. If, for example, a problem of spatial autocorrelation in the residuals is indicated this 
suggests there is a specification problem. Something which explains this pattern has been omitted 
and if the model is specified better then the problem should be resolved. Both theory and empirical 
evidence suggest that there are important spatial adjustment mechanisms and other spatially 
determined features of urban and regional economies. For example, labour markets and housing 
markets are likely to adjust to price and real wage differences in ways conditioned on some measure 
of accessibility. Both migration and commuting patterns are known to respond to spatial differences 
in economic opportunities – whether of money incomes or house prices – but the impact of a given 
differential in economic opportunities declines with distance. Theoretical and empirical 
investigations of agglomeration economies, human capital and innovation suggest there are 
important spatial aspects of these features of economies. These are possible sources of spatial 
interaction between cities’ economies which, if not represented in the model, would plausibly show 
up as spatial dependence.  
 
As the results reported below suggest, there seems to be some evidence in support for this view. 
When we estimate growth models using a GUM which has no variables designed to reflect these 
spatial adjustment processes, tests show that the specific model selected embodies problems of 
spatial dependence. The conventional solution would be to fix the problem by including an 
appropriate (spatial) econometric procedure. However, deliberately including in the GUM variables 
designed to reflect specific spatial economic adjustment processes (which are a function of the 
distance between cities) allows PcGets to select a specific model for which there are no indications 
of spatial dependence.  
 
In addition, the way in which the sensitivity of the models to measures of spatial dependence varies 
with the particular distance weights used provides, in our interpretation, insight into economic 
processes. Problems of spatial dependence only reveal themselves if an additional distance penalty to 
adjustment is included for national borders: this, we judge, tells one about the extent to which urban 
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2. The data 
All the analysis is performed on a data set built up over a 25 year period relating to Functional Urban 
Regions (FURs) defined so far as possible according to common criteria across the EU of 12. For a 
detailed discussion of how the FURs we use were defined see Cheshire and Hay (1989). The basic 
principle was to identify core cities  using the criterion of at least 20 000 jobs. For each of these 
concentrations of employment, hinterlands were defined from which more commuters flow to the 
employment core than to any other, subject to a minimum cut off level of commuting. The FURs used 
here were defined on the basis of 1971 employment and commuting data
3. They are broadly similar in 
concept to the (Standard) Metropolitan Statistical Areas used in the US although hinterlands tend to be 
extensive where there are no competing employment centres (examples are Lisbon or Dublin).  The data 
set only has the full set of variables for the largest FURs – those with a total population of a third of a 
million or more in 1981 and a core city which exceeded 200 000 at some date since 1951. The 
unification of Germany means that comparable data for the current FUR of Berlin are only available 
since 1990. So, Berlin is excluded, as are the FURs in the territory of the former GDR. This leaves a 
total 121 FURs which constitute our observations - so in all statistical estimation N=121. 
 
The great variability in the relationship between administrative boundaries and the economic reality of 
European cities and regions introduces serious error and a strong likelihood of bias into data reported for 
administratively defined regions and cities. The EU institutions deal in so-called Nomenclature des 
Unités Territoriales Statistiques (NUTS) regions. This is a nesting set of regions which tries to reconcile 
different national territorial divisions. The largest are Level 1 regions; the smallest for which a 
reasonable range of data is available are Level 3. These correspond to Counties in the UK, 
Départements in France; Provincies in Italy or Kreise in Germany. The size of these NUTS regions – 
even within the same ‘Level’ – is highly variable across Europe and even within countries. A further 
problem is that no ‘Level’ is actually represented in every country: in many countries they exist only for 
purposes of reporting data to Eurostat and other EU institutions. Thus, the most widely used regions – 
the Level 2 – do not exist for Germany or the UK. Particularly in Germany, this presents serious 
problems of data availability and comparability because the Level 1 regions correspond to the Länder 
which not only have considerable independence but also their own statistical services. In addition, 
                                                 
3 There are arguments both for and against using fixed boundaries. An argument against is that actual boundaries change 
over time as the location of employment and people changes. The impact of such changes has been investigated for a 
subset of 25 FURs in the course of an INTERREG IIB Project (GEMACA 2003). Details are available from the authors 
but the range of changes in total population estimates for 1991 using first boundaries defined on 1971 employment and 
commuting then boundaries defined on 1991 data was mainly from 5 to 10 percent. London was an outlier with 
population some 35 percent greater on its 1991 patterns of employment location and commuting. Changes in estimated 
employment were always considerably smaller than for population. In practical terms we can anyway do no better than 
use the fixed if obsolescent boundaries. Re-estimating boundaries for all EU FURs would require resources on the scale 
of a National Statistical Office. 
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Germany has not had a population census since 1987 and uses its own labour market regions to collect 
most labour market data.  
 
One of the variables most subject to distortion is GDP p.c. because GDP is estimated at workplaces 
while people are counted where they live. Because people commute to work across administrative 
boundaries this means GDP p.c. is systematically overestimated in cities which are also NUTS regions 
where the administrative boundaries exclude significant dormitory areas. In reality, this happens for a 
large number of bigger European cities (Madrid and Paris are two exceptions if the NUTS 1 regions are 
used) meaning that official figures systematically overstate GDP p.c. for large cities
4. At last, this 
distortion of GDP p.c. data the present NUTS system generates has been recognised by Eurostat 
(Eurostat, 2005). Following the 1998 split of Greater London into two official regions
5 – Inner and 
Outer London – the absurdity of the resulting GDP p.c. measures – with Inner London having a reported 
per capita GDP 3.15 times the EU mean - became too great to continue to ignore.  
 
…in some regions the GDP per capita figure can be significantly influenced by commuter 
flows….[so] that GDP per capita can be overestimated in these regions (e.g. Inner London) 
and underestimated in the regions where commuters live (e.g. Outer London, Kent and Essex). 
(Eurostat, 2005) 
 
The FUR and NUTS region of Bremen provide an extreme but not wholly unrepresentative example of 
how this distorts measured growth rates as well as levels of GDP p.c. as over time people move relative 
to the location of jobs. Because of strong relative population decentralisation over the relevant period the 
growth of GDP p.c. is overstated by some 40% for the period of the 1980s if the published Eurostat data 
for the NUTS Level 1 region identified as Bremen
6 are relied on.  
 
As defined, FURs correspond to the economic spheres of influence of significant employment 
concentrations and are relatively self-contained in economic terms. The variables used are identified in 
Table 1 which also indicates how the automated model selection procedures were structured. They are 
defined more fully in Appendix Table 1 which also provides a brief description of how they were 
                                                 
4 This potential for distortion is used for political purposes. In 1988 when the criteria for regional assistance were defined 
and the threshold was set at 75% of the EU mean, the Dutch created a ‘poor’ region, Flevoland, by combining the 
suburbs of Amsterdam with the agricultural areas to the north. The  British were not dissatisfied with the split of London 
into two regions in 1998. 
5 The FUR of London used here was nearly 30% larger in population terms than the NUTS Level 1 region of Greater 
London. 
6 A curious fact is that Bremen as a Hanseatic League state retained its historic independence so it is a Land – so a NUTS 
1 regions. This is despite the fact that its territory is split between two separate enclaves and in 2001 its reported NUTS 
population was 660 000: while its estimated FUR population was 1 305 000. 
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measured and the sources used.  Appendix 2 explores some of the differences between our estimated 
FUR GDP p.c. and its growth and equivalent NUTS 3 data
7.  Two pairs of FURs – Lille and 
Valenciennes and Portsmouth and Southampton – are entirely contained within two NUTS 3 regions so 
their GDP p.c. estimates were the same. One other pair of FURs – Sunderland and Newcastle – is 
mainly within a single NUTS 3 region.  
Table 1 about here 
Because of measurement error and short run fluctuations in Eurostat data, we take the start point of the 
series as the mean for 1978-80 and the end point as the mean for 1992-94. Regional GDP data have 
been published for most Level 1, 2 and 3 regions since 1978 although for some it is available from 1977. 
There are, however, gaps – data for Greek and Portuguese regions, for example, only became available 
from a later date. In both cases, Eurostat data have been supplemented with national data. For some 
countries, such as Italy, data for earlier years were only published for Level 2 regions. National sources, 
for example of value added in Italy, have been used to disaggregate from Level 2 to Level 3 values 
where none are available from Eurostat.   
 
One final point relating to Eurostat regional GDP data is that the basis on which values were 
estimated was substantially revised in 1995. Eurostat switched from a 1979 base for disaggregating 
national data (ESA79) to a base-year of 1995 (ESA95). The differences between the two sets of 
values are remarkable - not even country totals coincide. Although some claim to have successfully 
bridged this discontinuity in the regional GDP data (particularly affecting Germany) we have not 
been able to do so to our satisfaction. So our analysis finishes in 1994.  
 
All data are defined to common statistical concepts either weighting data available from the Eurostat 
REGIO database to estimate values for FURs (as with GDP p.c.) or collecting data directly from 
national statistical offices or common data providers and adjusting where necessary to common 
definitions.  
 
There is necessarily some imperfection and imprecision in the estimated data we use but they have the 
merit of relating to functionally defined city-regions which are so far as possible self contained in 
economic terms. This allows us to estimate our policy incentive variable. The FURs, all being large 
                                                 
7 FUR GDP p.c. was estimated from NUTS 3 data. To illustrate this process of estimation with the example of Bremen: 
the population of our FUR was divided between seven NUTS 3 regions for which we had Eurostat GDP p.c. data. In 
1991, the proportionate distribution of Bremen’s population between these NUTS regions was 0.4345, 0.1508, 0.1128, 
0.0942, 0.0767, 0.0713 and 0.0597. These proportions were applied as weights to each of the seven NUTS regions’ GDP 
p.c. to estimate the value of GDP p.c. for the FUR of Bremen.  We also have the proportionate distribution of FUR 
populations between NUTS 3 regions as at 1981. The FUR data for any year were estimated using population weights 
calculated from national population censuses or registration data closest in time to that for which the Level 3 regions’ 
data (e.g. GDP p.c.) related. 
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metropolitan regions, are also substantially more homogenous than either NUTS regions or countries, 
which is econometrically helpful; and they do not exhaust national territories. This last property allows 
us to calculate another useful variable – the rate of growth in the area of each country outside its major 
city-regions. 
 
3. The ‘artisanal’ approach 
 
The authors’ first approach to testing the hypotheses relating to the role of European integration, human 
capital and R & D and arrangements for local government was a traditional ‘artisanal’ approach building 
on previous work (see Cheshire and Magrini. 2000 or 2006). We found ‘base models’, then included the 
variables designed to test the three hypotheses; and then tested the resulting fitted models for a range of 
econometric problems critically including testing for spatial dependence. Such tests showed that while 
traditional standards for normality, functional form and heterskedasticity were satisfied, if the spatial 
weights matrix was formulated in an economically meaningful way (with an added time-distance 
penalty for interactions across national frontiers) problems of spatial dependence remained. While in 
this particular case these could be resolved by including a spatial lag and employing a maximum 
likelihood estimator, as noted above, this was not our preferred strategy. So, a significant effort was put 
into formulating variables designed to reflect known information on spatial adjustment processes.  Such 
variables turned out to be significant and to resolve problems of spatial dependence. 
 
This section very briefly explains the main variables used in this artisanal approach and summarises the 
results in order to be able to compare the results with those obtained using automated model selection 
with PcGets. As noted above, the independent variable was the annualised rate of growth of GDP pc in 
each FUR in the EU of 12 over the period 1979 to 1994, using the mean of the first and last three years 
as the start and end dates. The ‘base model’ then used a set of control variables relating to each FUR and 
the rate of growth of GDP pc over the same period in the areas of each country outside the major FURs. 
The same control variables were used for industrial structure as had been used in previous work (see 
Cheshire and Magrini, 2000). These detailed measures, relating to old resource-based industries – 
coalmining and ports - work better than broader measures of specialisation in industry and, moreover, 
make better sense in economic terms.  
 
A measure of the rate of growth of GDP p.c. in the area of each country outside the major FURs is 
included as a control for national institutional, policy, incidence of the economic cycle and other factors 
associated with country-specific differences in growth rates over the period. Although national dummies 
have been the way in which this problem has frequently been handled in the growth regression literature 
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dealing with regions it seemed to us both more elegant and powerful to use this continuous variable as 
well as more consistent with the underlying assumption that we were analysing a homogeneous sample
8. 
Besides being highly significant, a further point of interest is that it eliminates the significance of any 
measure of the initial level of GDP p.c.. Previous work has shown that both the significance and even 
sign of this commonly used variable were highly dependent on model specification (Cheshire and 
Carbonaro, 1995) and this confirms that result. This finding is one factor underlying our scepticism with 
respect to the many estimates of so-called β-convergence following Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991; 1992; 1995). All the results of models which included the initial level of per capita 
income were unsatisfactory, with highly unstable co-efficient estimates associated with the variable and 
problems of collinearity.  
 
Other controls included in the base model were designed to reflect as far as possible underlying (urban) 
economic theory and evidence. The log of population size is included with the expectation that larger 
cities will have grown faster in terms of GDP p.c. because of productivity gains in larger urban areas 
(see Costa and Kahn, 2000 for a convincing account of at least one important source of such 
productivity gains in larger cities). Dynamic agglomeration economies are another possible explanation. 
Initial population density was included since, allowing for agglomeration economies, cities with higher 
density will have higher costs of space and greater congestion. A negative relationship is expected. In 
our judgement, initial population density is likely mainly to reflect differences between FURs in the 
constraint on urban land supply produced by land use regulation. Higher density, other things equal, 
signals a tighter constraint imposed on development. Topography and the inertia of inheritance 
embodied in the built environment no doubt contribute to differences in densities but probably less than 
land use policy which varies substantially both across countries and between cities in Europe. 
 
We then move to independent variables designed to test our hypotheses. Our observational units 
represent sub-national economic regions, as economically self-contained as are likely to exist, so any 
impacts of local policy which influence the relative costs or competitiveness of economic agents 
(whether intended to stimulate local growth or not) will be confined to economic actors living or 
operating within them. Spillovers will be minimised and externalities internalised within our FURs.  
Any local policy action which increases local growth involves the provision of a local public good: the 
benefits of growth are non-excludable and have a zero opportunity cost in consumption. This 
                                                 
8 Another problem with national dummies in the present context is that in several countries there are not enough 
observations (one in Ireland, two each in Denmark, Greece and Portugal) for national dummies to be appropriate so some 
grouping of countries is essential. Since any grouping is arbitrary, the dummies do not do what they should. This 
objection does not apply to the continuous variable used here, possible because the major FURs do not exhaust national 
territories. In population terms they account for about half of the aggregate. 
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characteristic generates the usual problem of how ‘local growth’ may be generated. It is reasonable to 
think of any FUR as being made up of one or more administrative units and that a 'club' of 
administrative units (usually including private sector actors) will have to be formed to provide growth 
promotion policies: these are, in essence, what regional development agencies and lobby groups such as 
London First for example, are. They are local growth promotions ‘clubs’.  
 
It is also reasonable to assume that the largest unit within the FUR – the central unit – will always be a 
part of such a club, either alone or together with other administrative units, so the territory of a FUR is 
made up of two potential sets of governmental units: the policy club members and the group of non-
participating units. Whether or not such growth promotion policies are engaged in will be conditioned 
primarily on the structure of the incentives faced by these governmental and other economic actors who 
may attempt to form a public/private consortium or ‘growth promotion club’.  
 
The expected gross payoff will be a direct function of the additional growth that a given club expects it 
can generate. Since a FUR’s boundaries compared to any others that might exist for an urban area – 
most obviously political boundaries - contain the maximum proportion of any the benefits that might be 
generated by local growth promotion policies, for a given potential growth gain the expected payoff for 
any growth club will fall as the size of the territory falls in relation to that of the FUR within the 
boundaries of which the ‘club’ is located. This is because the spillover losses to areas of the FUR not 
represented in the club increase. Equally, assuming other factors are constant, the expected net payoff 
would fall as the transactions costs incurred to form the club increase. Transactions costs will be 
positively related to the number of relevant potential members and the institutional dominance of the 
lead actor (which we can assume will be a governmental unit). Thus expected net benefits will increase 
and costs fall as the size of the largest governmental unit increases relative to the size of the FUR. 
Arguments such as these led Cheshire and Gordon (1996, page 389) to conclude that growth promotion 
policies would be more likely to appear and be more energetically pursued where 'there are a smaller 
number of public agencies representing the functional economic region, with the boundaries of the 
highest tier authority approximating to those of the region…'. 
 
With these arguments in mind, it is possible to specify a variable closely reflecting this feature of FURs: 
the ratio of the total population of the largest (relevant) unit of government representing the FUR to the 
population of the FUR as a whole. We are implicitly assuming this will be the governmental unit with 
the largest population, usually representing the central administrative unit of the FUR, but this is 
qualified by 'relevant': by which we mean that the governmental unit concerned must have significant 
powers of action. Even though it might be the largest NUTS region with a territory overlapping that of 
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the London FUR, for example, the South East Region would not have been a 'relevant' governmental 
unit because it had essentially no powers
9.  The rules by which such ‘relevant’ local government units 
were identified were established before any models including the variable were estimated so that the 
variable could be defined blind of the data. The rules used are set out in Appendix 1.  
 
We should stress that we do not conceive of growth promotion policies in the narrow sense in which 
their advocates often speak of them: as policies aimed at the direct attraction of mobile investment. 
We have a much broader definition in mind. Such policies include: having a concern for efficient 
public administration so that uncertainty is reduced; making sure relevant infrastructure is provided 
and maintained; co-ordination between public and private investment; providing training which is 
relevant and effective; and ensuring that land use policies are flexible and co-ordinated with 
infrastructure provision and the demands of private sector investors. It could also involve giving a 
higher priority to output growth as opposed to equity or environmental outcomes. It need not involve 
spending more, even on infrastructure, so a simple measure of local expenditure is unlikely to be an 
appropriate measure of the efficacy of growth promotion efforts even were such a variable available. 
Grand projects such, perhaps, as the Guggenheim museum in Bilbao, London’s Millennium Dome or 
a trophy metro system in Toulouse – may be expensive but not productive; efficient public 
administration and reduction of uncertainty for private investment by rapid public decision-making, 
clearly defined land use policies and infrastructure planning, may cost less than their inefficient 
alternatives and be beneficial in terms of local growth. 
 
Since any output of such policies is a pure local public good
10 it will be hard to impossible to exclude 
agents who have not contributed to the policy from any benefits the policy generates; and there will be a 
zero opportunity cost in consumption: if your rents rise so do mine and the increase in yours is not a cost 
to me; if your employment opportunities improve that, too, is not a cost to mine. The closer the 
coincidence in the boundaries of the governmental unit providing such policies with those of the 
economic region within which their impact is contained, the less will be the spatial spillovers to non-
contributors. In addition, the larger is the central unit of government of an economically self-contained 
urban region relative to the size of that region as a whole, the lower will be the transactions costs in 
building a 'growth promotion’ club. 
 
                                                 
9 During the period analysed there was a South East Regional Planning Council (SERPLAN) but this was effectively no 
more than a forum for discussion. 
10 The local public good is, of course any growth they may produce. Resources employed in the promotion of growth are 
simply a cost. 
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We call this the policy incentive variable because it is designed to measure the incentive to implement 
policies promoting growth at the FUR level
. Since one criterion used to select the ‘relevant’ 
governmental unit for each FUR was that it should have significant administrative and decision making 
powers, the Level 1 regions were potentially available for selection in European countries with a 
regional level of government. In practice, this meant that the value of the variable could range from only 
about 0.125 to over 2 (in Spain). We might further hypothesise that if the value of the variable were very 
high, so that the size of the ‘relevant’ unit of government substantially exceeded the size of the FUR, 
then the incentive to generate local growth promoting policies would begin to weaken. This is because 
the interests of the FUR would begin to be lost in those of the larger unit which might pursue policies 
favouring rural areas or smaller centres. If this were the case then we would expect to observe a 
quadratic functional form with a maximum positive impact where the value of the policy incentive 
variable was rather more than 1 but less than 2.  
 
The concentration of the R&D facilities of large companies and of university students per employee 
(both measured for the start of the period analysed) are included to test for the influence on local growth 
of highly skilled human capital and specialisation in R&D. The theoretical reasons for focusing on these 
factors follow the analysis of Romer (1990) as adapted to a spatial context by, for example, Cheshire 
and Carbonaro (1995) and Magrini (1997; 1998). There is an extensive literature on the role of human 
capital in economic growth and the tendency for innovation to be localised with respect to R&D so the 
inclusion of these variables requires little justification.  
 
At least since the 1960s there have been arguments that (European) integration would have 
systematic spatial effects, economically favouring ‘core’ regions. An early empirical attempt to 
quantify such effects was embodied in the work of Clark et al., (1969). More recently theoretical 
work by Krugman and Venables has produced formal models with essentially the same conclusions 
(see Fujita et al., 1999, for a survey). The Integration Gain variable, is designed to measure the direct 
spatial impacts of European integration and is calculated from the work of Clark et al., (1969) 
supplemented with the estimates for the regions of Spain and Portugal provided by Keeble et al., 
(1988), scaled to Clark et al’s values. Values for Athens, Lisboa, Porto and Saliniki were interpolated 
to provide coverage of all the regions of the EU of 12. Since our interest is in growth we calculated 
the change in the values of 'economic potential'
11 from the pre-Treaty of Rome values to those 
estimated as being associated with an elimination of tariffs, the EU’s enlargement of the 1980s and a 
reduction in transport costs following the introduction of roll-on roll-off ferries and containerisation. 
                                                 
11 Economic potential is a measure of the accessibility at any point to total GDP allowing for costs of distance including 
tariffs. For further discussion see Clark et al., 1969  
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As elaborated in Cheshire and Magrini (2000) the theoretical arguments as to why integration should 
favour core regions do not imply that the relationship measured for the 1980s or the 1990s should 
necessarily be linear with respect to the variable used here so a quadratic term was included. 
 
As is well known a key problem in testing for spatial dependence compared to serial autocorrelation 
is the specification of the ‘proximity’ of one observation to another. There is no obvious basis upon 
which distance weights can be determined. As is often the reality with applied work, insight and 
experimentation are complementary. Our insight grew with experiment and tests were conducted 
using 28 different distance weight matrices. In this paper, we report only the results for which the 
greatest sensitivity was found and which seem most faithfully to represent underlying spatial 
processes. Full results are available from the authors. Measuring distance as the inverse of time-
distance between FURs, using the standard road freight software, not only seems to represent 
‘proximity’ in the most economically meaningful way but always provided more measured 
sensitivity to spatial dependence than distance measured as the crow flies or as road kilometres. In 
Tables 2b, 3b and 4b, we report results for two formulations - the inverse of time-distance and the 
inverse of time-distance squared.  
 
An innovation, however, is that we have also included an additional ‘time-distance penalty’ if FURs 
are separated by a national border. This partly reflects recent work reported in Cheshire and Magrini 
(2006) which found that there was adjustment within countries but not between them to differences 
in quality of life. The implication is that national borders in Europe still represent substantial barriers 
to spatial adjustment. Border time-distance costs from zero to infinity were experimented with and 
the results were generally most sensitive if it was implicitly assumed a national border represented a 
time-distance of 600 minutes. 
 
If we look at the test results reported in Tables 3b and 4b, which include specifications in which we 
expect to find problems of spatial dependence, we see that if no time-distance penalty is included for 
national borders it is easy to conclude that there are no problems of spatial dependence. Such 
problems are only indicated for the simplest specifications using restricted GUMs - Models 1a and b. 




As noted above the authors’ preferred approach is not to attempt to resolve problems of spatial 
dependence with the technical fix but rather to interpret such test results as indicating an underlying 
problem of omitted variables. We should not expect the growth behaviour of a FUR to be 
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independent of that of its neighbours. The most obvious reason is the literature on labour market 
search behaviour. If productivity, wages or job opportunities are relatively improving in one urban 
area then those who can access those opportunities at the lowest cost – who live nearest – will tend to 
do so. Migration is expensive but changes in commuting patterns respond to only small differences 
in opportunities (see, for example, Gordon and Lamont, 1982 or Morrison, 2006). We should expect 
that if a FUR’s growth rate were negatively influenced by a concentration of unemployment in it at 
the start of the period then a concentration of unemployed in closely surrounding FURs would also 
have a negative impact. Given the possibility of job search in surrounding nearby labour markets we 
would expect higher unemployment not to be just localised, moreover, but in densely urbanised 
regions, we would expect unemployment rates for workers of comparable skill levels to even out 
between neighbouring FURs. Since job search areas and commuting distances of the less skilled 
(proportionately more strongly represented among the unemployed) are relatively shorter we should 
also expect the influence of localised unemployment to be relatively short range. 
 
Similarly the literature on the spatial pattern of innovation shows a distance decay effect, with 
patents tending to be applied more frequently nearer to the location of the patent and innovation rates 
declining with distance. So the impact of R&D with respect to innovation is subject to a distance 
decay effect (see for example Audretsch, 1998). This implies that we should expect R&D in one 
urban area to have some positive differential impact on innovation and growth in neighbouring urban 
areas compared to more distant urban areas. Such mechanisms, leading to systematic spatial 
dependence in the growth rates of FURs, will depend on the costs of commuting and perhaps 
communication. It, therefore, seems not only most appropriate to formulate these ‘spatial’ variables 
so that their impact declines with distance but also to include a specific time-distance penalty for 
national borders. We in fact experimented with alternative distance decay and national border factors 
but the best results were obtained using essentially the same formulae as employed to calculate the 
spatial weights matrix. The impact of unemployment and R&D on growth performance in 
neighbouring FURs was assumed to decline with the inverse squared of time-distance and be subject 
to a 600 minute national border time-distance penalty. For unemployment, an upper cut-off of 60 
minutes and for R&D of 150 minutes was applied before adding the national border penalty. These 
spatial variables were calculated for all FURs by adding the observed value of the variable in FURi 
to that observed in FURj-n discounting by time-distance.  
 
The third ‘spatial’ variable is the relative concentration of university students in neighbouring FURs at 
the start of the period. Here we expect a negative impact on growth in a particular FUR of a stronger 
relative concentration of university students at the start of the period in neighbouring FURs; and we also 
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expect the distance over which such an effect would be measured to be longer than with unemployment. 
While a higher stock of unemployed within a tightly clustered set of urban areas should be expected to 
contribute to lower growth in all of them because of the way in which local labour markets work to even 
out unemployment rates for workers of given skill levels between areas open to commuting
12, the same 
is not true of a higher relative stock of university students in surrounding FURs at the start of the period. 
Here, there is no tendency for their distribution to be evened out by the operation of local labour 
markets: rather a higher stock within a given FUR at the start of the period represented a resource for 
future growth over the study period. A concentration of workers embodying greater human capital is 
associated with faster growth over the subsequent period in the FUR in which they are found. Not only 
should this be expected to increase the growth performance of the FUR (captured in our direct 
University Student variable) but also the additional growth will increase relative job opportunities and 
tend to suck in complementary labour including high human capital labour from surrounding FURs over 
the study period. Since the commuting range of higher skilled workers is greater, we should expect this 
effect to be measurable over a longer distance than was the case with unemployment. The best results 
were obtained if the cut off was set at 150 minutes to which was again added a 600 minute national 
border time-distance penalty. 
 
The final ‘spatial’ variable was a dummy for peripherality. There has been much discussion in the 
literature of the impact of peripherality. We have already accounted for the impact of European 
integration via our Integration Gain variable but regions deemed peripheral may have common features 
(such as lower factor costs for example) and also have tended to be recipients of regional aid from the 
EU. Although the impact of such aid has been questioned (see, for example, Midelfart and Overman, 
2002, or Fratesi and Rodriguez-Pose, 2004) still it is unlikely to have been systematically negative. To 
avoid subjective judgements about what regions are - or are not - peripheral this is formulated simply in 
terms of time-distance from Brussels; any FUR 600 minutes or more from Brussels is classified as 
peripheral.  
Tables 2a & 2b about here 
There was no theoretical basis on which to select the value of the cut-off thresholds for any of these 
‘spatial’ variables. They were determined by a combination of knowledge of the empirical literature 
on, for example, spatial labour markets and by experiment. In all cases the selected cut-offs worked 
best in an empirical sense: either in the case of formulating the distance weights matrix to test for 
spatial dependence, they tended to produce the greatest sensitivity to tests; or, in formulating 
                                                 
12 Although FURs are defined to be as self contained in commuting terms as possible where they are tightly packed (for 
example in the Ruhr region of Germany) it is virtually zero cost for a worker living on the edge of any FUR to change to 
commute to the neighbouring FUR(s). 
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variables to represent spatial processes, they produced the best results both in terms of significance 
and in terms of eliminating indications of spatial dependence. The final test results for the two 
‘artisanal’ models reported in Table 2a, are shown in Table 2b. There are no signs either of classic 
econometric problems such as heteroskedasticity or non-normality of errors nor of spatial 
dependence. The models perform well and provide evidence consistent with the hypotheses we were 
interested in testing. 
 
4. Results of automated model selection 
As Hendry and Krolzig (2004) observe, the use of an appropriate algorithm to select a specific model 
does not absolve the researcher from the normal precautions and judgements needed: but it saves a 
lot of time and makes model selection less subjective. In this section, we report the results of 
applying such model selection procedures to the present data set, informed by our experience with a 
traditional, artisanal approach. We have two aims: the first is to see whether the best artisanal models 
are, or are close to, those which emerge from a sophisticated automated selection procedure. We 
should say that while our artisanal models benefited in our judgement from experimentation, they 
were not data mining in anything like the sense that is implied by Sala-i-Martin’s 1997 claim to have 
run ‘two million models’.  While our variables were limited by data availability, we spent 
considerable efforts in trying to construct specific variables to test particular hypotheses and our 
choice of models was always guided by a view of underlying causal processes. The second aim is to 
test that model selection process in an application to cross sectional data where we would expect 
there to be underlying mechanisms generating spatial dependence. This later aim is met by a two-
stage process in specifying the GUM indicated in Table 1. In the first, we exclude all those variables 
we had defined to try to reflect underlying spatial mechanisms, select a specific model, and then test 
for problems of spatial dependence. We then extend the set of variables in the GUM to include all the 
‘spatial’ variables to see i) if such variables are selected by PcGets and ii) –if they are – whether the 
resulting best model is now free of problems of spatial dependence. 
 
As recognised in Hendry & Krolzig (2001 and 2004) it is not always appropriate to simply throw all 
possible variables into the GUM and select the resulting model. For convenience we organised our 
data into the four groupings reported in Table 1: these were designed to explore 1) all the main 
economic variables included in the artisanal models; 2) then the use of country dummies as well as - 
or instead of - our non-FUR growth variable; 3) the role of additional variables available to us which 
we had not included in our data set for deriving the artisanal models; and then 4) as noted above, the 
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full set of data except the country dummies which Models 2a and 2b showed not to be satisfactory, 
plus all the ‘spatial variables’. 
 
The results are set out in Tables 3a and 4a while the tests results are in Tables 3b and 3c. Models 1a 
and 1b provide essentially the same results as the artisanal models do for all variables but in 
particular for three of those designed to test our main hypotheses.  The Integration Gain variable, 
since it relates to spatial processes, is only included in GUM4 but the specific models 1a and 1b 
include our measures of highly skilled human capital and R&D facilities per employee and also our 
policy incentive variable. This latter is included in both linear and quadratic form but there is only 
weak evidence on which to select a quadratic form. The regression test results reported in Table 2b, 
however, show that while there are no real signs of non-normality of errors or heteroskedasticity, 
whenever a border distance penalty is included in estimating the distance weights matrix, problems 
of spatial dependence emerge. 
Tables 3a & b and 4a & b about here 
Models 2a and 2b explore the use of national dummies – most commonly used in the growth 
regression literature - compared to our non-FUR growth variable. If the observations truly reflect a 
homogeneous population then the non-FUR growth variable would seem to be appropriate. Results 
are significantly better if the non-FUR growth variable is included in the GUM. It is selected at the 
expense of all but one national dummy – that for Germany and Denmark combined. Moreover, the 
regression test statistics are generally more favourable. If the non-FUR growth variable is excluded 
from the GUM (Model 2b) then there are problems on non-normality of errors and heteroskedasticity 
in addition to spatial dependence. 
 
For a priori reasons and on the basis of these results, the national dummies are excluded from 
subsequent GUMs but GUM3 then includes a set of climatic variables. There is substantial 
multicolinearity between these but it appears that warmer weather is associated with slower 
economic growth. Over the range of observations, the functional form is almost linear although the 
specific model selected includes the squared version. Performance with respect to normality of errors 
and heteroskedasticity is acceptable although there continue to be indications of spatial dependence if a 
time-distance border penalty is included. 
 
GUM4 now includes all available variables except national dummies. The selected models are shown in 
Table 4a as Models 4a and b. It will be seen that the selected models include the full set of ‘spatial 
variables’ included in our artisanal models and, from Table 4b, that all signs of spatial dependence are 
eliminated. The conclusion would seem to be, therefore, that in cross sectional investigations there are 
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likely to be spatial economic mechanisms which need to be explicitly included. They are in the 
underlying data generating process. Moreover, if they are included the general to specific model 
selection algorithm embodied in PcGets will select them - thus eliminating the need to find ways of 
(spatial) econometric methods to obtain consistent estimates. 
 
Thus, with one exception, the results obtained using appropriate methods of automated model selection 
support the artisanal results and also the claim in Hendry and Krolzig (2004) that their use frees up 
research time for more useful tasks than even traditional methods relying only lightly on data mining 
necessitate. The exception is the fact that the final selected models – 4a and 4b - include climatic 
variables even when as full a range of ‘spatial variables’ as possible is included in the GUM.  At first 
blush, it may not seem obvious why climate should systematically influence urban economic 
performance in any causal way; but drawing on the literature deriving from Roback (1982) and 
reviewed in Gyourko et al (1999) there is, in fact, a reasonable argument. A better climate will be 
capitalised into land prices and traded off by individuals against higher wages. In a previous and related 
paper (Cheshire and Magrini 2006) the present authors had, moreover, found that national climatic 
differences were very significant in explaining patterns of population growth and mobility between 
FURs within countries. There appeared to be a process of sorting between FURs, with concentrations of 
human capital and R&D facilities being negatively but not significantly associated with population 
growth, while a drier and warmer climate relative to a country’s mean was strongly and significantly 
associated with population growth. This suggested that there was some selection process going on with 
people more motivated by quality of life and with lower skills tending to be differentially attracted to 
cities with a better relative climate. This implied, other things equal, that those more work and skill 
oriented – together with activities employing such labour – would find costs lower and welfare levels 
higher in FURs with relatively worse climates. Since this was a dynamic process – the dependent 
variable was a proxy for net migration – it would imply a faster rate of productivity and wage growth in 
FURs with climates worse than their countries’ means. In essence, this is no more than the application 
of the insight that people who think they are likely to be unemployed anyway might as well live 
somewhere nice if there is a national system of welfare support.  
 
5. Conclusions 
One conclusion is, therefore, that by including variables reflecting theoretically relevant spatial 
adjustment mechanisms it is possible effectively to eliminate apparent problems of spatial dependence. 
This supports our view that spatial dependence largely reflects model specification and if explicit spatial 
factors are included, such problems are resolved. Furthermore testing for spatial dependence is itself 
very demanding. It was only when the lessons of Cheshire and Magrini (2006) were applied, and a 
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substantial time penalty for national borders was introduced into the distance weights matrix, that tests 
revealed any problems of spatial dependence.  
 
These conclusions are confirmed using automated model selection methods. If appropriate variables 
representing underlying spatial adjustment mechanisms are included in the GUM, they are selected in 
the specific model and tests reveal no problems of spatial dependence. These variables reflecting spatial 
adjustment mechanisms were formulated specifically to reflect the lessons derived from experimentation 
with the choice of weights in constructing the spatial weights matrix. Each ‘spatial variable’ imposed the 
same border distance penalty of 600 minutes. 
 
This in turn lends credibility to our judgement that our GUM4 is a sufficiently good approximation of 
the underlying data generating process that we can gain insight into causal processes from our best 
models. Both the artisanal best models and the two specific models 4a and b, produce essentially the 
same result. They provide support for the hypotheses identified in the introduction. There is evidence 
that local differences in human capital and R&D activity are important factors in explaining differential 
rates of urban economic growth and that European integration has had a significant impact in 
accelerating growth in core regions of Europe. There is also evidence, however, that at the same time, 
once we had offset for all other factors including the systematic impacts of integration itself, all 
peripheral regions were on average growing relative to the rest of the EU. Finally, there is new evidence 
supporting the conclusion that administrative and government arrangements for cities systematically 
influence their growth. Where there is a governmental unit approximating the economic boundaries of 
an economically self-contained city-region, growth is stronger, other things equal. This is consistent 
with the expectations relating to the promotion of growth as a local public good and the resulting 
advantage if spillover losses and transactions costs are minimised. 
 
In this context, it should again be stressed that policies encouraging local economic growth are not 
conceived of as being particularly concerned with inward investment nor even, necessarily, with 
explicitly promoting growth at all. They may consist mainly of efficient local public administration, the 
avoidance of waste and a focus on activities that government at an urban level can effectively influence, 
such as the supply of skills or infrastructure planning, rather than redistribution. It is not possible to 
measure these factors comparably across the urban areas of the EU as a whole. Indeed, it is difficult to 
think of any general direct quantitative indicator. Work in the US, for example Rappaport 1999, has 
used measures of individual policies, such as expenditures on elementary and secondary school 
education. The variable used in the present paper seems justified on theoretical grounds but is an indirect 
measure, designed to reflect not the policies themselves, but the incentive for such policies to be 
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generated. The significance of this variable is apparent even in a very simple model but more fully 
specified models and further testing confirm its statistical significance and provide some evidence of a 
quadratic functional form. This suggests that if the government unit is too large relative to the FUR 
concerned, the interests of the FUR may tend to get lost in those of the larger region. 
 
The results also support the conclusion of Cheshire and Magrini (2006). A compensating variations 
model across the whole territory of the EU of 12 is not appropriate because while adjustments do 
occur, they occur mainly within nations not across the EU as a whole. Here we find that indications 
of spatial dependence in the results are only observed if a substantial time-distance penalty is added 
where FURs are separated by national boundaries. On average results are most sensitive if national 
boundaries are represented by a penalty equivalent to 600 minutes travel time. The nature of our 
methodology, of course, does not allow us to discriminate so that is consistent with the barrier 
represented by a national border being greater in some contexts and less in others. The results 
reported in these papers taken together, however, lend support to the conclusion that in a European 
context of restricted labour mobility and continuing national border effects, income growth rather 
than population growth is a more appropriate indicator of improvements in welfare in a city.  
 
The empirical results also provide support for the theoretical work of Magrini (1997; 1998) on the role 
of human capital in regional growth and its interaction with the effects of integration. In this, a plausible 
outcome of the process of European integration is that regional economic growth diverges temporally 
and the disparities in per capita income permanently increase rather than converge. Integration similar to 
that which has characterised recent European history is seen as a possible cause for the emergence of a 
new steady-state equilibrium characterised by a further concentration of research activities in the regions 
which were already relatively specialised in research. While the adjustment takes place through the 
spatial reallocation of unskilled labour and human capital, the average per capita income in the more 
innovative, relatively research-intensive region(s) grows at a faster rate than in the other region(s). At 
the same time 'unskilled' labour (and population) increases in the non-research specialised regions. This 
leads to a new steady-state distribution of per capita income characterised by an increase in spatial 
disparities. This may be stretching our results rather far but is consistent both with the significant 
positive impact of concentrations of R&D and highly skilled human capital and the significant negative 
effect of a better climate in explaining GDP pc growth. 
 
The results do not identify an obvious lever policy makers could pull to change the outcomes observed. 
It does not follow, for example, that if every city were given the same proportion of university students 
per employee they would all have grown at the same rate as the actually best endowed with universities 
  21European Urban Growth: now for some problems of spaceless and weightless econometrics 
 
did. While true that the differences in endowment with universities was one factor in explaining growth 
differences - and that helps understand what was going on - there is no necessary symmetry about the 
impact of giving all cities the same sized relative university sectors. It is probable that the unobserved 
characteristics of the cities with the highest ratios of university students were, and still are, different in 
important ways from cities with the lowest ratios; and were not independent of the concentration of 
universities in them. Nor is it possible to think in practical terms of providing all cities with equally high 
ratios of university students per employee and maintaining a constant quality of university students (and 
students who then disproportionately join the local labour force).  
 
It is perhaps more plausible to think of the findings on the policy incentive variable as identifying a 
‘policy lever’. Local and regional government boundaries and functions could be restructured and, if 
an important element of the disadvantage FURs with fragmented local government structures face 
results from the problems of spillovers and transaction costs entailed in pursuing effective growth 
policies, the outcome should be more effective growth policies all round. A problem is that, of 
course, ‘effective’ local growth promotion policies at present, in circumstances in which not all city 
regions are equally well endowed with the incentive to develop them, may be significantly 
competitive and diversionary. Some local growth may be zero sum. The success of the successful 
may significantly be a function of the poor performance of the unsuccessful. It does not follow that 
all policies designed to promote local growth are zero sum, however. It is reasonable to expect that 
there could be net efficiency gains for the EU's urban system as a whole if government boundaries – 
at least for the highest strategic tiers of local government – were aligned more closely with those 
reflecting economically relevant patterns of behaviour and spatial economic organisation. 
 
  22European Urban Growth: now for some problems of spaceless and weightless econometrics 
 
References 
Alonso, W. (1964)  ‘Location Theory’, in Regional Development and Planning, (J. Friedmann and 
W. Alonso, Eds.), Cambridge MA: MIT Press.  
Audretsch, D. B. (1998), ‘Agglomeration and the Location of Innovative Activity’, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 14 (2), 18-29. 
Barro, R.J. (1990) ‘Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 98, S103-S125. 
Barro, R. J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1991), “Convergence across States and Regions” Brooking Papers 
on Economic Activity, 1: 107-182. 
Barro, R. J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1992), “Convergence” Journal of Political Economy 100 (2), 223-
251. 
Barro, R.J. and X. Sala-i-Martin, (1995) Economic Growth, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Cheshire, P.C. and D. G. Hay, (1989), Urban Problems in Western Europe: an economic analysis, 
Unwin Hyman: London. 
Cheshire, P.C. and G. Carbonaro, (1995), 'Convergence-Divergence in Regional Growth Rates: An 
Empty Black Box?', In Armstrong, H.W. and Vickerman, R.W. (Eds.), Convergence and 
Divergence Among European Regions, London: Pion. 
Cheshire, P.C. and I.R. Gordon (1996)  'Territorial Competition and the Logic of Collective  (In)action', 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 20, 383-99. 
Cheshire, P.C. and S. Magrini, (2000) ‘Endogenous Processes in European Regional Growth: 
Implications for Convergence and Policy’, Growth and Change, 32, 4, 455-79. 
Cheshire, P.C. and S. Magrini, (2006) ‘Population Growth in European Cities: weather matters – but 
only nationally’, Regional Studies, 40, 1, 23-37.  
Clark, C., F. Wilson, and J. Bradley, (1969) ‘Industrial location and economic potential in Western 
Europe’ Regional Studies, 3, 197-212. 
Costa, D.L.and M.E. Kahn (2000) 'Power Couples: Changes in the Locational Choice of the College 
Educated, 1940-1990', Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(4), 1287-1315. 
Durlauf, S.N. and D. Quah (1999) 'The new empirics of economic growth', In Taylor, J.B. and M. 
Woodford (eds) Handbook of macroeconomics, Volume 1A, 2335-308. North Holland, 
Amsterdam  
Eurostat (2005) News Release 47/2005, 7
th April. 
Florax, R.J.G.M., H. Folmer and S.J. Rey (2003) ‘Specification searches in spatial econometrics: the 
relevance of Hendry’s methodology’, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 33 (5), 557-579. 
Fratesi, U. and A. Rodriguez-Pose (2004) ‘Between Development and Social Policies: The Impact of 
European Structural Funds in Objective 1 Regions’, Regional Studies, 38, 1, 97-113. 
Fujita, M., P. Krugman and A.Venables (1999) The Spatial Economy, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Glaeser, E.L., J.A.Scheinkman and A. Shleifer (1995) 'Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Cities', 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 36, 117-43. 
Gordon, I. and Lamont, D. (1982) A model of Labour-market Interdependencies in the London 
Region. Environment and Planning A, 14, 238-64. 
Gyourko, J., M. Kahn and J. Tracy (1999) ‘Quality of Life and Environmental Comparisons’ in 
P.C.Cheshire and E. Mills (Eds) Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Vol. 3: Applied 
Urban Economics, North Holland: Amsterdam. 
Hendry D. F. and H-M. Krolzig (2001) Automated Econometric Model Selection Using PcGets, 
Timberlake Consultants. 
Hendry D. F. and H-M. Krolzig (2004) ‘We Ran One Regression’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 66 (5), 799-810. 
Keeble, D., J. Offord and S. Walker (1988) Peripheral Regions in a Community of Twelve Member 
States, Office of Official Publications, Luxembourg.  
Magrini, S. (1997) ‘Spatial Concentration in Research and Regional Income Disparities in a 
Decentralised Model of Endogenous Growth’, Research Paper in Environmental and Spatial 
Analysis No. 43, London School of Economics  
  23European Urban Growth: now for some problems of spaceless and weightless econometrics 
 
Magrini, S. (1998) Modelling Regional Economic Growth: The Role of Human Capital and 
Innovation,  Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics. 
Magrini, S. (2004) ‘Regional (Di)Convergence’, In Henderson, V. and Thisse, J.-F.. (Eds.), 
Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Vol. 4. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2004). 
Midelfart, K.H and H.G.Overman (2002) ‘Delocation and European Integration: Is European 
Structural Spending Justified?’, Economic Policy, 35, 321-359. 
Morrison, P. S. (2005) ‘Unemployment and Urban Labour Markets’,  Urban Studies, 42,12, 2261-
2288. 
Oates, W.E. (1999) ‘An Essay on Fiscal Federalism’, Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVII, 1120-
49. 
Rappaport, J. (1999) Local Growth Empirics, CID Working paper 23, Center for International 
Development at Harvard University, Cambridge, M.A. 
Rey, S.J. and B.D. Montuori (1999) US regional income convergence: a spatial economic 
perspective. Regional Studies, 33:143-156. 
Roback, J. (1982) ‘ Wages, rents, and the quality of life’, Journal of Political Economy, 90, 1257-
1278. 
Romer, P. (1990) 'Endogenous Technological Change', Journal of Political Economy, 98, S71-S102.  
Temple J (1999) The new growth evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 37: 112–156. 
  24European Urban Growth: now for some problems of spaceless and weightless econometrics 
 
Table 1: Variables Included in Sequence of General Unrestricted Models  
No GUM  Variable Name  Description 
Core Included in General Unrestricted Models 
 All  Constant   
1  All  Ln Population  Natural log of population in 1979 
2  All  Population density  Density of population in FUR in 1979 
3  All  Industrial Emp. 1975  % of labour force in industry in surrounding NUTS 2 region 1975 
4  All  Coalfield: core  A dummy=1 if the core of the FUR is located within a coalfield 
5  All  Coalfield: hinterland  A dummy=1 if the hinterland of the FUR is located in a coalfield 
6  All  Port size 1969*  Volume of port trade in 1969 in tons 
7  All  Agric Emp.1975*  % of labour force in agriculture in surrounding NUTS 2 region 1975
8 All  Unemployment 
1977/81*  Mean FUR unemployment rate 1977 to 1981 
9  1,2a,3 
& 4 
Nat Ex-FUR GDP 
Growth  ’79-‘93 
Annualised rate of growth of GDP p.c. in the territory of each 
country outside major FURs between 1978/80 and 1992/94 
10 All  Policy  Incentive*  Ratio of FUR population to that of the largest governmental unit 
associated with the FUR (1981): see below for details. 
11 All  University Staff  emp. 
ratio 1977/78/79*  Ratio of university staff 1977-78 to total FUR employment 1979 
12 All  University Students emp. 
ratio 1977/78/79*  Ratio of university students 1977-78 to total FUR employment 1979
13 All  R&D Facilities per 
million population* 
R&D laboratories of Fortune top 500 companies per million 
population 1980 
14 All  R&D Facilities per 
million employed* 
R&D laboratories of Fortune top 500 companies per million 
employees 1980 
Country Dummies Included in Second General Unrestricted Models 
15  2  United Kingdom  Dummy=1 for all FURs in United Kingdom: otherwise=0 
16  2  France  Dummy=1 for all FURs in France: otherwise=0  
17  2  Spain  Dummy=1 for all FURs in Spain: otherwise=0 
18  2  Benelux  Dummy=1 for all FURs in Belgium & Netherlands: otherwise=0 
19  2  Germany & Denmark  Dummy=1 for all FURs in Germany & Denmark: otherwise=0 
20  2  Italy & Greece  Dummy=1 for all FURs in Italy & Greece: otherwise=0 
21 2  North Italy  Dummy=1 for all FURs in north of Rome: otherwise=0 
Climate Variables Included in Third and Fourth General Unrestricted Models 
22  3, 4  Frost frequency*  Ratio of frequency of days with frost between FUR and national 
average (1970s and 1980s) 
23  3, 4  Wet days*  Ratio of wet day frequency between FUR and national average 
(1970s and 1980s) 
24  3, 4  Maximum temperature*  Ratio of maximum temperature between FUR and national average 
(1970s and 1980s) 
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Table 1 continued 
    Spatial Adjustment Variables Included in Fourth General Unrestricted Model 
25 4  Integration  Gain*  Change in economic potential for FUR resulting from pre-Treaty of 
Rome EEC to post enlargement EU with reduced transport costs  
26  4  Peripherality dummy  Dummy=1 if FUR more than 10 hours time distance from Brussels 
27 4  University Student 
density employment 
Sum of university students per 1000 employees in all FURs within 150 
minutes travel time discounted by distance with 600 time penalty 
added for national borders 
28 4  University Staff density
employment  
 Sum of university staff per 1000 employees in all FURs within 150 
minutes travel time discounted by distance with 600 time penalty 
added for national borders 
29 4  R&D Facilities density 
employment 
Sum of R&D Facilities per million employees in all FURs within 150 
minutes travel time discounted by distance with 600 time penalty for 
national borders 
30 4  R&D Facilities density 
population 
Sum of R&D Facilities per million population in all FURs within 150 
minutes travel time discounted by distance with 600 time penalty for 
national borders 
31 4  Unemployment 
1977/81 density  
Sum of differences between the unemployment rate (average between 
1977 and 1981) of a FUR and the rates in neighbouring FURs (60min) 
discounted by distance by the distance 
* Variables tried as a quadratic for reasons explained in the text. Never entered as squared value alone. 
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Table 2a:  Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to mean 
1992/4: ‘Artisanal’  Results 
  Model 1  Model 2 
R
2  0.7413 0.7555 
Adjusted R
2  0.6986 0.7095 
AIC -11.026  -11.044 
LIK 685.071  688.488 
Observations 121  121 
Constant -0.0234  -0.026257 
s.e. 0.00925  0.009192 
Nat Non-FUR GDP Growth ’79-’93  0.89487  0.902537 
s.e. 0.09931  0.097571 
Coalfield: core  -0.00516  -0.005213 
s.e. 0.00128  0.001287 
Coalfield: hint’land  -0.00346  -0.003176 
s.e. 0.00155  0.001526 
Port size 1969  -0.00100  -0.000922 
s.e. 0.00038  0.000379 
Port size 1969 squared  0.0000481  0.0000450* 
s.e. 0.0000240  0.0000237 
Agric Emp.1975  0.000389  0.004838 
s.e. 0.000155  0.000159 
Agric Emp.1975
 squared -0.0000113  -0.000012 
s.e. 0.0000040  0.000004 
Unemployment 1977/81  -0.00033  -0.000310 
s.e. 0.00014  0.000136 
Ln Population 1981  0.00165  0.001611 
s.e. 0.00057  0.000557 
Population Density 1981  -0.0000014  -0.0000013 
s.e. 0.0000006  0.0000006 
Integration Gain  0.00460  0.005162 
s.e. 0.00144  0.001430 
University Student emp. ratio 1977/78/79  0.0000368  0.000031 
s.e. 0.0000101  0.000011 
R&D Facilities pop. per million  0.000896  0.000845 
s.e. 0.000275  0.000275 
Policy incentive  0.00266  0.008562
a 
s.e. 0.00108  0.003455 
Policy incentive squared    -0.002647*
 a 
s.e.    0.001554 
R&D Facilities density population  0.19680  0.262331 
s.e. 0.08742  0.094307 
Peripherality Dummy  0.00593  0.005411 
s.e. 0.00131  0.001318 
University Student density employment  -0.00894  -0.010527 
s.e. 0.00381  0.003797 
Unemployment 1977/81 density    -0.134403* 
s.e.   0.069318 
Italics indicate not significant at 10%: all variables significant at 5% except where indicated with an asterisk. 
aSignificant at 10% only but F test indicates they should not be excluded as a pair at 5% level 
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Table 3a:  Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to mean 
1992/4: Finding Core Variables – including Non-FUR Growth: PcGets 
Model 1a  1b  2a  2b 
R
2 0.6712  0.6785  0.6897  0.6193 
Adjusted R
2   0.6347  0.6372  0.6520  0.5731 
AIC -10.8690  -10.8686  -10.9102  -10.7058 
LIK 670.57  671.55  674.06  661.70 
Constant -0.03099  -0.03200  -0.03233  -0.02745 
s.e. 0.00937  0.00937  0.00927  0.0092 
Coalfield: core  -0.00632  -0.00621  -0.00578  -0.00579 
s.e. 0.00120  0.00120  0.00118  0.00130 
Coalfield: hint’land  -0.00437  -0.00418  -0.00372   
s.e. 0.00160  0.00160  0.00161   
Port size 1969  -0.00145  -0.00147  -0.00116  -0.00057 
s.e. 0.00040  0.00040  0.00039  0.00020 
Port size 1969 squared  0.00007  0.00008  0.00006   
s.e. 0.00003  0.00003  0.00002   
Agric Emp.1975  0.00047  0.00051  0.00044  0.00094 
s.e. 0.00016  0.00016  0.00015  0.00018 
Agric Emp.1975
 squared -0.000013 -0.000013  -0.000014  -0.000023 
s.e. 0.000004  0.000004  0.000002  0.000005 
Nat Non-FUR GDP Growth ’79-’93  0.95219  0.94416  1.16248   
s.e. 0.10255  0.10238  0.11628   
Ln Population 1981  0.00211  0.00212  0.00154  0.00234 
s.e. 0.00060  0.00060  0.00058  0.00063 
Population Density 1981  -0.0000016 -0.0000015    
s.e. 0.0000007 0.0000007     
Unemployment 1977/81     -0.00047  -0.00049 
s.e.     0.00015  0.00017 
University Student emp. ratio 1977/78/79 0.000036  0.000031 0.000036  0.000035 
s.e. 0.000007  0.000012 0.000014  0.000013 
R&D Facilities pop. per million  0.00078  0.00081    
s.e. 0.00029  0.00029    
Policy incentive  0.00330  0.00750 0.00720 0.01017
a 
s.e. 0.00108  0.00335 0.00342  0.00397 
Policy incentive squared    -0.00209 -0.00192 -0.00311*
a 
s.e.    0.00158 0.00160  0.00181 
Germany & Denmark     -0.00536 -0.00340 
s.e.     0.00128 0.00140 
France      -0.01210 
s.e.      0.00149 
Italy & Greece      -0.00338 
s.e.      0.00169 
Spain      -0.00413 
s.e.      0.00185 
Italics indicate not significant at 10%: all variables significant at 5% except where indicated with an asterisk.  
aSignificant at 10% only but F test indicates they should not be excluded as a pair at 5% level 
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Table 4a:  Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to mean 
1992/4: Finding Specific Models – including spatial variables: PcGets 
Model 3a  3b  4a  4b 
R
2 0.6789 0.6781 0.7646  0.7719
Adjusted R
2 0.6399  0.6390  0.7175  0.7235 
AIC -10.7447  -10.8736  -11.0706  -10.8792 
LIK 672.00  671.86  690.77  692.68 
Constant -0.02507 -0.02051 -0.03720  -0.03772
s.e. 0.00934  0.00986  0.01024  0.01004 
Coalfield: core  -0.00665 -0.00663 -0.00489  -0.00524
s.e.  0.00118    0.00118    0.00128  0.00128 
Coalfield: hint’land  -0.00451 -0.00447 -0.00331  -0.00327
s.e. 0.00159  0.00159  0.00151  0.00150 
Port size ’69  -0.00143 -0.00143 -0.00104  -0.00096
s.e. 0.00040  0.00040  0.00037  0.00037 
Port size ’69 squared 0.00007 0.000074 0.000051 0.000047
s.e. 0.00002  0.000025  0.000023  0.000023 
Agric Emp.’75 0.00062 0.00062 0.00034  0.00038
s.e. 0.00015  0.00015  0.00016  0.00016 
Agric Emp.’75
 squared -0.000015 -0.000015 -0.0000093  -0.000010
s.e. 0.000004  0.000004  0.0000041  0.000004 
Nat Non-FUR GDP Growth ’79-’93  0.92382 0.92452 0.84862  0.85222
s.e. 0.10106  0.10120  0.09823  0.09720 
Ln Population 1981  0.00195 0.00196 0.00149  0.00146
s.e. 0.00059  0.00059  0.00055  0.00055 
Population Density 1981  -0.0000014  -0.0000013
s.e.     0.0000006  0.0000006 
Unemployment 1977/81  -0.00040 -0.00035
s.e.     0.00014  0.00014 
University Student emp. ratio 1977/78/79 0.00003 0.0000283 0.0000270 0.0000259
s.e. 0.00001  0.0000114 0.0000110  0.0000104 
R&D Facilities pop. per million  0.00095 0.00095 0.00086 0.00079
s.e. 0.00029  0.00029 0.00027  0.00027 
Policy incentive  0.00871 0.00870 0.00666*  0.00770
a
s.e. 0.00334  0.00335  0.00342  0.00343 
Policy incentive squared -0.00269* -0.00269* -0.00219  -0.00253
a
s.e. 0.00158  0.00158  0.00153 0.00153 
Maximum temperature -0.00943  
s.e.   0.00397    
Maximum temperature squared -0.00467  
s.e. 0.00192      
Wet days  0.03992 0.03834
s.e.     0.01463 0.01450 
Wet days squared  -0.02029 -0.01928
s.e.     0.00731 0.00725 
Integration gain  0.00408 0.00435
s.e.     0.00150 0.00149 
Peripherality dummy 0.00647 0.00632
s.e.     0.00134 0.00133 
Unemployment 1977/81 density  -0.12129*
s.e.      0.06806 
University Student density employment -0.00992 -0.01097
s.e.     0.00370 0.00371 
R&D Facilities density population  0.18092 0.25088
s.e.     0.08620 0.09388 
Italics indicate not significant at 10%: all variables significant at 5% except where indicated with an asterisk. 
aSignificant at 10% only but F test indicates they should not be excluded as a pair at 5% level 
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Table 2b: Regression diagnostics for spatial dependence:  ‘Artisanal Models’ 
REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS (SpaceStat)  Models  1      2   
MULTICOLLINEARITY CONDITION NUMBER              98.92 100.87
TEST ON NORMALITY OF ERRORS  DF  Value  Prob  DF  Value  Prob 
TEST=Jarque-Bera      2  0.8264 0.3814    1.2374 2  0.5386
DIAGNOSTICS FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY             
RANDOM COEFFICIENTS  DF  Value  Prob  DF  Value  Prob 
TEST=Breusch-Pagan      17  0.2747 19.9917  19   20.8169   0.3470
DIAGNOSTICS FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE             
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance with infinite national border effect 
TEST MI/DF      Value Prob MI/DF      Value Prob
Moran's I (error)  -0.05797  -0.3996  0.6895  -0.04784  -0.1457  0.8842 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  1.6403  0.2003  1  1.1171  0.2905 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  1.0696  0.3010  1  1.4510  0.2284 
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance squared with infinite national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  -0.06968  -0.2986  0.7653  -0.06140  -0.1916  0.8480 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  1.0860  0.2974  1  0.8432  0.3585 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  1.4589  0.2271  1  1.9795  0.1594 
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance with 600 minute national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  -0.01668  0.6336  0.5263  -0.01504  0.6940  0.4877 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  0.4839  0.4867  1  0.3938  0.5303 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  0.5667  0.4516  1  0.9660  0.3257 
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance squared with 600 minute national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  -0.03840  -0.1358  0.8919  -0.03589  -0.1484  0.8820 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  0.4452  0.5046  1  0.3888  0.5329 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  1.1855  0.2762  1  1.5291  0.2162 
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance with zero national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  -0.01672  0.3679  0.7129  -0.01538  0.4386  0.6610 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  0.7609  0.3830  1  0.6440  0.4223 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  0.0702  0.7911  1  0.4333  0.5104 
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance squared with zero national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  -0.02915  0.1787  0.8582  -0.02911  0.1375  0.8906 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  0.3506  0.5538  1  0.3498  0.5542 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  0.0494  0.8240  1  0.1902  0.6627 
* Results in italics are significant at 10% level; Results in bold are significant at 5% level 
  30European Urban Growth: now for some problems of spaceless and weightless econometrics 
 
 Table 3b: Regression diagnostics for spatial dependence:  Finding Core Variables – including Non-FUR Growth: PcGets 
*Results in italics are significant at 10% level; Results in bold are significant at 5% level
REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS (SpaceStat)  Models                       1a 1b 2a 2b
MULTICOLLINEARITY CONDITION NUMBER  78.77                     80.62 82.53 79.76
TEST ON NORMALITY OF ERRORS  DF                      Value Prob DF Value Prob DF Value  Prob DF Value Prob
TEST=Jarque-Bera  2            2.0205  0.3641 2 3.3273 0.1894 2 0.5832 0.7471 2 4.8275 0.0895
DIAGNOSTICS FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY                   
RANDOM COEFFICIENTS  DF                    Value Prob DF Value  Prob DF Value  Prob DF Value Prob
TEST=Breusch-Pagan  12            17.3352 0.1374 13 19.3825 0.1117 13 17.2585 0.1878 13 22.9188 0.0427
DIAGNOSTICS FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE                   
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance with infinite national border effect 
TEST  MI/DF          Value Prob            MI/DF Value Prob MI/DF Value Prob MI/DF Value Prob
Moran's I (error)  0.0404  1.7904      0.0734 0.04344  1.8729 0.0611 -0.00051 0.9328 0.3509 0.03703 2.3959 0.0166
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1          0.7982  0.3716 1 0.9212 0.3372 1 0.00013 0.9910 1 0.6693  0.4133
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  7.0480          0.0079 1  6.6183 0.0101 1 2.0401 0.1532 1 9.0238 0.0027
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance squared with infinite national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  0.05348    1.3687    0.1711 0.05593  1.4068 0.1595 0.0353 1.2243 0.2208 0.0602 1.8836  0.0596 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  0.6397  0.4238 1 0.6996 0.4029 1 0.2793 0.5972 1 0.8108  0.3679 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  7.3863      0.0066 1  7.1177 0.0076 1  4.1352 0.0420 1  7.4412 0.0064
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance with 600 minute national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  0.03000  2.8340      0.0046 0.0303  2.8693 0.0041 0.0106 1.9680 0.0491 -0.00375 1.5111 0.1308
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  1.5625  0.2113 1 1.5984 0.2061 1 0.1962 0.6578 1 0.0244  0.8758 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1          6.0683  0.0138 1  5.8394 0.0157 1 1.9789 0.1595 1 4.2374 0.0395
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance squared with 600 minute national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  0.06565  1.7792    0.0752 0.06620  1.7888 0.0736 0.0486 1.6014 0.1093 0.0169      1.2432 0.2138
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  1.3012  0.2540 1 1.3233 0.2500 1 0.7120 0.3988 1 0.0864  0.7688 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  7.5294    0.0061 1  7.1366 0.0076 1  4.1707 0.0411 1 4.6681  0.0307 
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance with zero national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  0.0145      2.3944  0.0166 0.0143  2.3972 0.0165 0.0024 1.6411 0.1008 -0.00758 1.1601 0.2460
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  0.5733  0.4489 1 0.5553 0.4561 1 0.0162 0.8988 1 0.1563  0.6926 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  2.7475          0.0974 1 2.4908 0.1145 1 0.9117 0.3397 1 2.5622  0.1094
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance squared with zero national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  0.0612  1.8831      0.0597 0.0573  1.7963 0.0724 0.0388 1.5205 0.1284 -0.01480 0.5336 0.5936
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  1.5445  0.2139 1 1.3549 0.2444 1 0.6212 0.4306 1 0.0903  0.7637 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  3.3245        0.0683 1  2.8781 0.0898 1 1.7275 0.1887 1 1.8729  0.1711
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Table 4b: Regression diagnostics for spatial dependence: Finding Specific Models – including spatial variables: PcGets 
*Results in italics are significant at 10% level; Results in bold are significant at 5% level 
REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS (SpaceStat)  Models 3a 3b 4a 4b
MULTICOLLINEARITY CONDITION NUMBER  82.89                      84.99 170.27 170.52
TEST ON NORMALITY OF ERRORS  DF  Value                Prob DF  Value Prob DF  Value Prob DF  Value Prob
TEST=Jarque-Bera  2  0.7819          0.6764 2 0.8204 0.6635 2 2.6862 0.2610 2 3.1805  0.2039
DIAGNOSTICS FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY                    
RANDOM COEFFICIENTS  DF                        Value Prob DF Value Prob DF Value Prob DF Value Prob
TEST=Breusch-Pagan  13  20.0332 0.0944 13        19.7273 0.1022 20 28.8825 0.0901 21 28.6001  0.1239
DIAGNOSTICS FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE                    
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance with infinite national border effect 
TEST  MI/DF            Value Prob            MI/DF Value Prob MI/DF Value Prob MI/DF Value Prob
Moran's I (error)  0.0009        0.8554  0.3923 0.00034 0.8409 0.4004 -0.06077 -0.3790 0.7047 -0.05938 -0.3514 0.7253
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1    0.0004  0.9839 1 0.0001 0.9941 1 1.8028 0.1794 1 1.7209  0.1896
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  3.4779        0.0622 1  3.3025 0.0692 1 1.1523 0.2831 1 1.5775  0.2091
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance squared with infinite national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  -0.0003  0.5994  0.5489 -0.000678 0.5908 0.5547 -0.07938 -0.3516 0.7252 -0.08193 -0.4126 0.6799 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1    0.0000  0.9969 1 0.0001 0.9919 1 1.4097 0.2351 1 1.5016  0.2204
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  4.1455        0.0417 1  4. 2780 0.0448 1 1.1355 0.2866 1 1.6855  0.1942
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance with 600 minute national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  0.0036  1.4127  0.1578 0.00325 1.3942 0.1635 -0.02087 0.4745 0.6351 -0.02051 0.4639    0.6427
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1    0.0226  0.8804 1 0.0184 0.8921 1 0.7580 0.3840 1 0.7321  0.3922
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1          2.4557  0.1171 1 2.2956 0.1297 1 0.5202 0.4708 1 1.1201  0.2899
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance squared with 600 minute national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  0.0073  0.7723  0.4399 0.00717    0.7675 0.4428 -0.0568 -0.1169 0.9070 -0.05842 -0.1759    0.8604
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1    0.0162  0.8986 1 0.01553 0.9008 1  0.9744 0.3236 1  1.0305  0.3100
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  3.6785        0.0551 1  3.5446 0.0597 1 0.7455 0.3879 1 1.2755  0.2587
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance with zero national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  -0.0075  0.7255  0.4681 -0.00789 0.6955 0.4867 -0.01663 0.4849 0.6278 -0.0159      0.5131 0.6079
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1    0.1540  0.6948 1 0.1694 0.6807 1 0.7528 0.3856 1 0.6882  0.4068
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1          0.7989  0.3714 1 0.7157 0.3976 1 0.0646 0.7993 1 0.5508  0.4580
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance squared with zero national border effect 
Moran's I (error)  -0.0130  0.3251  0.7451 -0.01343 0.3138 0.7537 -0.03323 0.1825 0.8552 -0.03337 0.1464    0.8836
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1    0.0700  0.7914 1 0.0744 0.7850 1 0.4557 0.4996 1 0.4596  0.4978
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1          0.6212  0.4306 1 0.5785 0.4469 1 0.00002 0.9961 1 0.1367  0.7116
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions and data 
 
Appendix Table 1: The dependent variable was in all cases the annualised rate of FUR growth in 
estimated GDP p.c. converted at OECD PPS. Growth measured between means of 1978/80 and 
1992/94 and estimated from Eurostat NUTS 3 and national data as described in text 
 Variable  Name  Description 
1  Ln Population  Natural log of population in 1979 
2  Population density  Density of population in FUR in 1979 
3  Coalfield: core   A dummy=1 if the core of the FUR is located within a coalfield 
4  Coalfield: hinterland  A dummy=1 if the hinterland of the FUR is located in a coalfield 
6  Port size ’69  Volume of port trade in 1969 in tons 
7 Agric  Emp.’75  Percentage of labour force in agriculture in surrounding Level 2 
region in 1975 
8  Nat Ex-FUR GDP Grow  ’79-‘93  Annualised rate of growth of GDP p.c. in the territory of each 
country outside major FURs between 1978/80 and 1992/94 
9 Policy  Incentive  Ratio of FUR population to the that of the largest governmental unit 
associated with the FUR (1981): see below for details. 
10 Integration Gain 
Change in economic potential for FUR resulting from movement 
from individual nation-states to post enlargement EU with reduced 
transport costs  
11 University Students ratio 1977/78/79  Ratio between university and higher education students (1977-
1978) and total employment (1979) 
12 University Student density in 
neighbouring FURs within 150 minutes 
Sum of university and higher education students per 1000 
employees in all FURs within 150 minutes travel time with 600 
time penalty added for national borders 
13 R&D Facilities per million population  R&D laboratories of Fortune top 300 companies per million 
employees (1980) 
14 
R&D Facilities per million in FURs 
within 150 minutes+600 min border 
cost 
Sum of R&D Facilities per million employees in all FURs within 
150 minutes travel time with 600 time penalty for national borders 
15 Density of Unemployment in FURs 
within 60 minutes 
Sum of differences between the unemployment rate (average 
between 1977 and 1981) of a FUR and the rates in neighbouring 
FURs (60min) weighted by the distance 
16 Dummy for peripheral FURs 600 mins 
or more travel time from Brussels 
Dummy variable = 0 if FUR is less than 600 minutes travel time 
(allowing for sea crossings) from Brussels: =1 for all other FURs 
 
To estimate the Policy Incentive variable the rules determining the selection of the largest 'relevant' 
governmental unit were: 
Belgium  The central communes for all except Bruxelles for which the capital region 
(Arrondissement) was taken; 
Denmark Central  Municipality; 
Germany  The Kreisfreie Stadte except for Bremen and Hamburg where the NUTS 1 
Land region was taken and Frankfurt where the Umlandverband was taken; 
France  Since there is a NUTS 1 region, the Ile de France, which has significant 
powers, was selected for Paris. Elsewhere in France the central Commune was 
selected except for those FURs for which a Communité Urbaine exists; in 
those cases the Communité Urbaine was selected 
Greece The  central  Municipality; 
Ireland  The County Borough (of Dublin); 
Italy  The central Commune was selected in all cases. Unlike the situation in France 
(Paris) or Germany (Bremen and Hamburg) there is no NUTS 1 or 2 region 
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corresponding to any city nor is there any city with a city wide tier of 
government (such as the Communité Urbaine). 
The Netherlands  The central Municipality (as Italy); 
Portugal  The central Municipality (as Italy); 
Spain  Where there was one major FUR in a Communidad Autonoma (a NUTS 2 
region), the Communidad Autonoma was selected; where there was more than 
one major FUR in the Communidad Autonoma but only one in the Provincia (a 
NUTS 3 region), the Provincia was selected; where there was more than one 
major FUR within a Provincia then the central Municipio was selected; 
United Kingdom  In England, the District was selected except in London where Inner London 
was used; in Scotland, the regions of Lothian and Strathclyde were taken and 
for Belfast the NUTS 1 region of Northern Ireland was the government unit 
identified. 
 
The only case, then, for which no obvious rule was available, was that of London because of the 
abolition of London-wide government in the middle of the period. In 1985, local government powers 
were re-assigned down to the 32 boroughs and up to committees of boroughs and to central government. 
There were further changes to this system in the later part of the period when the Government Office for 
London was set up.  The only stable unit of government relating to London was the City of London or 
the individual London boroughs but there was a regional authority – Greater London – for some of the 
period. The selection of Inner London - not really a governmental unit at all - represented no more than 
the most reasonable compromise. We tested alternatives and as might be expected, substituting the value 
for the largest borough or the GLC as a whole made no material difference to the results reported here. 
 
Sources for other data 
Variable  
number   
1  National Censuses of population or – where unavailable – national registration data 
2  Area from administrative maps 
3  Oxford Regional Economic Atlas, Oxford: OUP, 1971 
4  Oxford Regional Economic Atlas, Oxford: OUP, 1971 
5  Hanbusch der Europaischen Seehafen Band II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX & X Hamburg: 
Verlag Weltarchiv, various dates from 1968 
6 Eurostat 
7  Estimated from Eurostat data 
8  See above for details. 
9 Estimated  from  Clark  et al 1969 and Keeble et al 1988 
10 
University Students taken from The International Association of Universities,  International 
Handbook of Universities, 1978, (seventh edition), London: The Macmillan Press; Association of 
Commonwealth Universities, Commonwealth University Yearbook 1979, 1978, (fifty-fifth 
edition) London: The Association of Commonwealth Universities; and The World of Learning 
1978-1979, 1978, (twenty-ninth edition), London: Europa Publications: total employment 
estimated from Eurostat data 
11  University Student density as per variable11: time-distances here and elsewhere from standard 
road freight software 
12  R&D laboratories of Fortune top 500 companies as reported in Directory of European Research, 
London: Longman, 1982 
13  R&D Facilities  as per 13: time-distances as per 12 
14  Unemployment rates estimated for FURs from Eurostat NUT 3 data 
15  Time-distances from standard road freight software: Microsoft 
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Appendix 2: FUR and NUTS GDP data 
 
FUR  NUTS Level 3  % Difference FUR:NUTS 
   Growth rate 
1978/80 to 1992/94 
Mean GDP p.c. 
1992-94. 
Antwerpen Antwerpen  (Arrondissement)  2.02  -14.26 
Bruxelles-Brussel  Reg.Bruxelles-Cap./Brussels 
Hfdst.Gew.  -4.12 -59.64 
Charleroi Charleroi  -0.17  -8.60 
Liege Liege  (Arrondissement)  6.47  -0.43 
Aarhus Aarhus  Amt  0.62  0.01 
Koebenhavns Koebenhavns  Amt  -2.27  -7.82 
Aachen Aachen,  Landkr.  13.39  22.27 
Augsburg Augsburg,  Krfr.St.  -4.51  -42.99 
Bielefeld Lippe  0.05  16.26 
Bochum Recklinghausen  8.11  17.50 
Bonn Rhein-Sieg-Kreis  -1.05  21.75 
Braunschweig Braunschweig,  Krfr.St.  -3.70  -26.89 
Bremen Bremen,  Krfr.St.  0.80  -36.05 
Dortmund Dortmund,  Krfr.St.  2.32  -11.76 
Duesseldorf Duesseldorf,  Krfr.St.  -0.23  -51.05 
Duisburg Duisburg,  Krfr.St.  3.68  -12.00 
Essen Essen,  Krfr.St.  -3.76  -13.94 
Frankfurt  Frankfurt am Main, Krfr.St.  -0.08  -89.61 
Hamburg Hamburg  0.83  -27.67 
Hannover Hannover,  Landkr.  -3.49  38.82 
Karlsruhe,  Landkr.  0.46  21.95 
Kassel Kassel,  Landkr.  -12.13  19.47 
Koeln Koeln,  Krfr.St.  -0.32  -25.64 
Krefeld Viersen  -16.69  12.38 
Manheim Rhein-Neckar-Kreis  -9.62  30.27 
Moenchengladbach Moenchengladbach,  Krfr.St.  -1.12  -13.67 
Muenchen Muenchen,  Krfr.St.  0.60  -38.84 
Muenster Steinfurt  2.08  11.20 
Nuernberg Nuernberg,  Krfr.St.  -2.73  -47.74 
Saarbruecken Saarbruecken,  Stadtverband  3.10  -33.11 
Stuttgart Stuttgart,  Stadtkr.  -0.57  -60.71 
Wiesbaden Wiesbaden,  Krfr.St.  -22.16  -58.16 
Wuppertal Wuppertal,  Krfr.St. -1.79  -4.24 
Athens Attiki  -0.81  0.07 
Saloniki Thessaloniki  -0.15  -0.04 
Alicante Alicante  0.00  0.00 
Barcelona Barcelona  0.05  0.31 
Bilbao Vizcaya  -0.87  0.19 
Cordoba Cordoba  0.00  0.00 
Gijon/Aviles Asturias  0.00  0.00 
Granada Granada  -0.02  0.34 
La Coruna  La Coruna  0.00  0.00 
Madrid Madrid  -0.16  -0.58 
Malaga Malaga  0.02  -0.01 
Murcia Murcia  0.00  0.00 
Palma De Mallorca  Baleares  0.00  0.00 
Sevilla Sevilla  -0.43  -0.14 
Valencia Valencia  -0.16  0.19 
Valladolid Valladolid  0.01  -0.01 
Vigo Pontevedra  0.00  0.00 
Zaragoza Zaragoza  -2.31  0.53 
Bordeaux Gironde  0.03  -0.02 
Clermont-Ferrand Puy-de-Dome  0.00  0.00 
Dijon Cote-d'Or  0.00  0.00 
Grenoble Isere  -0.02  -0.01 
Karlsruhe 
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Le Havre  Seine-Maritime  0.00  0.00 
Lille Nord  0.00  0.00 
Lyon Rhone  -0.45  -5.67 
Marseille Bouches-du-Rhone  0.00  0.00 
Montpellier Herault  0.00  0.00 
Mulhouse Haut-Rhin  0.00  0.00 
Nancy Meurthe-et-Moselle  0.00  0.00 
Nantes Loire-Atlantique  0.81  -6.96 
Nice Alpes-Maritimes  0.00  0.00 
Orleans Loiret  0.37  -0.39 
Paris Paris  -6.12 -78.87 
Rennes Ille-et-Vilaine  0.00  0.00 
Rouen Seine-Maritime  2.19  -6.17 
St. Etienne  Loire  3.16  -1.60 
Strasbourg Bas-Rhin  0.00  0.00 
Toulon Var  0.00  0.00 
Toulouse Haute-Garonne  0.00  0.00 
Valenciennes Nord  0.00  0.00 
Dublin East  -7.12  5.94 
Bari Bari  11.43 6.03 
Bologna Bologna  -3.26  -3.72 
Brescia Brescia  4.16  -3.24 
Cagliari Cagliari  5.05  4.21 
Catania Catania  22.76  14.88 
Firenze Firenze(94)  15.27  10.52 
Genova Genova  5.58  6.46 
Messina Messina  12.86  10.51 
Milano Milano(94)  5.03  9.40 
Napoli Napoli  3.90  5.53 
Padova Padova  3.13  -0.34 
Palermo Palermo  12.41  10.30 
Roma Roma  1.36  -0.59 
Taranto Taranto  10.01  7.14 
Torino Torino  -8.16  -2.33 
Venezia Venezia  -3.26  -0.50 
Verona Verona  2.00  0.41 
Amsterdam Groot-Amsterdam  -7.30  -26.55 
Rotterdam Groot-Rijnmond  3.48  -5.48 
's-Gravenhage Agglom.'s-Gravenhage  6.74  -7.40 
Utrecht Utrecht  -0.75  -2.66 
Lisboa  Lisboa E Vale Do Tejo  2.88  -5.24 
Porto Norte  9.23  9.78 
Belfast Northern  Ireland  0.00  0.00 
Birmingham  West Midlands (County)  1.53  -2.93 
Brighton East  Sussex  4.68  7.22 
Bristol Avon  -0.99  -2.12 
Cardiff South  Glamorgan  -9.49  -20.80 
Coventry  West Midlands (County)  5.60  0.61 
Derby Derbyshire  -0.08  -0.18 
Edinburgh Lothian  -0.42  -0.73 
Glasgow Strathclyde -0.35  -0.04 
Hull Humberside  0.00  0.00 
Leeds West  Yorkshire  0.87  0.68 
Leicester Leicestershire  0.00  0.00 
Liverpool Merseyside  0.59  0.58 
London Greater  London  1.08  -9.42 
Manchester Greater  Manchester  1.42  1.20 
Newcastle Tyne  and  Wear  -1.83  -6.55 
Nottingham Nottinghamshire  0.05  -0.74 
Plymouth Devon  -2.66  -6.28 
Portsmouth Hampshire  0.00  0.00 
Sheffield South  Yorkshire  1.98  0.90 
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Southampton Hampshire  0.00  0.00 
Stoke Staffordshire  1.94  3.70 
Sunderland Tyne  and  Wear  -1.44  -4.95 
Teesside Cleveland  5.59  1.53 
 
The table above shows for each FUR the corresponding NUTS Level 3 region in which the largest 
proportion of its population resided in 1981. The last two columns show respectively the percentage 
difference in calculated growth rates for the estimated FUR and corresponding NUTS regions’ GDP 
p.c. between the mean of 1978/1980 and the mean of 1992/1994; and the percentage difference 
between the two GDP p.c. values for the mean of 1992/94. Other representations are, of course, 
possible. For example, here we are comparing just FUR and NUTS 3 data. But one could take 
different NUTS level regions e.g. the most commonly used - NUTS 2 regions – or vary the NUTS 
Level used according to the size of the city for different FURs and the results would be somewhat 
different. As can be seen growth rates using the basis of comparison illustrated here vary by up to 
23% while estimated GDP per capita varies up to 79% 
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